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Sullivan: Alcoholic Employees

BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE ALCOHOLIC
EMPLOYEE WITH THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS
OF THE EMPLOYER: REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION VS. UNDUE HARDSHIP
Roger M. Sullivan, Jr.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the last two decades, assumptions regarding
the causes of alcoholism have gradually changed. As a result of this
process, alcoholism has generally come to be regarded as an illness
as opposed to a volitionally inflicted problem.' During this same
time, both the federal government 2 and the State of Montana 3
have passed legislation intended to protect handicapped individuals from employment discrimination. Largely as a result of the developing notion that alcoholism is a disease, alcoholic employees
have begun to avail themselves of the provisions of these laws.4
Moreover, in Montana the emerging tort of wrongful discharge now
1. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 22686 (May 4, 1977): "There is a medical and legal consensus
that alcoholism and drug addiction are diseases although there is disagreement as to
whether they are primarily mental or physical." See also F. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT
OF ALCOHOLISM (1960); A Chemical Cause of Alcoholism, 111 SCIENCE NEWS 327 (1977);
Alcohol Metabolism: All in the Family, 115 SCIENCE NEWS 6 (1979), cited in Spencer, The
Developing Notion of Employer Responsibility for the Alcoholic, Drug-Addicted or Mentally Ill Employee: An Examination Under Federal and State Employment Statutes and
Arbitration Decisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 659, 661 n.2 (1979); Comment, Hidden Handicaps: Protection of Alcoholics, Drug Addicts, and the Mentally Ill Against Employment
Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Wisconsin FairEmployment
Act, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 725, 725 n.4.
Changing attitudes towards the use of alcohol, with attendant legal ramifications, are
nothing new to American society. Recall the adoption of the eighteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution in 1919, forbidding the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors," and its subsequent repeal in 1933 by the ratification of the twentyfirst amendment.
2. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
3. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-303, 49-4-101 (1983).
4. While the primary focus of this comment is on the alcoholic employee, it should be
noted that similar legal rights and remedies exist for the drug addicted or mentally ill employee. Dubbed "hidden handicaps," all three conditions cause similar problems for the employer. First, since such conditions are not readily apparent to employers, it can be difficult
to make a threshold determination as to whether the employee is in fact a handicapped
individual as contemplated by the employment discrimination laws. Second, such conditions
often result in only sporadic problems, making it difficult to determine if such a handicap is
significantly interfering with job performance. Thus, although each of the "hidden handicaps" raise considerations unique unto themselves (e.g., illegality of use of illicit drugs vs.
legality of use of alcoholic beverages), the general framework for analysis set forth in this
comment is largely applicable to all three conditions. See generally Spencer, supra note 1.
For that reason, this comment examines cases in which the courts have construed the employment rights of both alcoholic and drug addicted employees.
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provides such employees with an additional safeguard against employment discrimination. 5
The protection from employment discrimination thus accorded the alcoholic employee is not, however, without limits. Both
federal and state laws recognize the legitimate business concerns of
the employer as a defense to a charge of employment discrimination. The employer is thereby protected from having to assume an
undue hardship in accommodating the problems experienced by
the alcoholic employee. Thus, in ruling on claims brought by alcoholic employees under these laws, the courts have developed methods of balancing the rights of employee and employer.
This comment examines the protections from employment discrimination that are afforded the alcoholic employee under federal
and state law, as well as the legitimate business concerns that an
employer can assert in defense of employment decisions affecting
an alcoholic employee. In addition, this comment examines court
decisions construing these laws.
II.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS By ALCOHOLIC
EMPLOYEES UNDER FEDERAL LAW

Initial efforts by the federal government to prohibit employment discrimination did not address discrimination of the handicapped. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 prohibited employment discrimination only on the basis of sex, color, race,
religion, or national origin.7 Likewise, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 19678 prohibited such discrimination against
individuals between the ages of forty and seventy.9 Although the
rights of the handicapped have been a long-term federal concern,"
not until the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Act)" were
5. The Montana Supreme Court has recognized that a tort claim sounding in wrongful
discharge lies when the discharge is in violation of public policy. While not limited to either,
both administrative rules of a state agency and statutes provide actionable standards of
639
public policy for such claims. See Nye v. Department of Livestock, - Mont. -,
Mont. -,
676 P.2d 162, 165
P.2d 498, 502 (1982); Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., __
(1984). See also Hopkins & Robinson, Employment At-Will, Wrongful Discharge,and the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Montana, Past, Present, and Future, 46
MoNT. L. REV. 1 (1985).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982).
10. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 668. See also Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection Against Employment Discrimination For Alcoholics and
Drug Addicts, 28 AMER. U.L. REV. 507, 509 (1979).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982).
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handicapped individuals protected by the federal government from
employment discrimination.
A.

The RehabilitationAct of 1973

Dubbed the "civil rights act for the handicapped,' 12 Title V of
the Act 3 contains the major substantive employment discrimination provisions. Section 503 of the Act mandates that federal contractors and subcontractors take affirmative action "to employ and
advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals."' 4 Even
broader in scope, and thus relied on more often by handicapped
persons, section 504 of the Act provides in relevant part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined in section 7(B) of this Act, shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' 5
While the Act on its face was not clear as to whether alcoholics and drug addicts were covered by the Act, regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Act included alcoholism and drug addiction within the definition of "handicapped individual."' 6 Like12. See Linn, Uncle Sam Doesn't Want You: Entering the Federal Stronghold of Employment Discrimination Against Handicapped Individuals, Symposium-Employment
Rights of the Handicapped,27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1978), quoted in Spencer, supra
note 1, at 668.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-794 (1982).
14. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982), Section 503 of the Act provides in pertinent
part:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or
agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in
employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the
United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment
qualified handicapped individuals. . . . The provisions of this section shall apply
to any subcontract in excess of $2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal
services (including construction) for the United States.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 7(B) of the Act defines the scope of coverage afforded alcoholics and drug abusers. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B); see also text accompanying
note 20, infra. It should be noted that under both sections 503 and 504, the receipt of federal assistance by the employer is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a claim under the Act. See
Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
16. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare promulgated regulations including alcoholics and drug addicts within the definition of "handicapped individual." See
45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 404 (1978). Later in 1981, the Department of Labor also promulgated regulations which included alcoholics and drug addicts in the definition of "handicapped individual." Those regulations remain substantially the same today:
(a) "Handicapped individual" means any person who
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
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wise, the U.S. Attorney General in 1977 issued an opinion which
concluded, after reviewing the legislative history of the Act, that
Congress did intend to include alcoholics and drug addicts in the
definition, thereby protecting them from discrimination. 7 The implications of such inclusion had an unsettling effect on employers.1 8 In response, Congress in 1978 amended the Act' 9 to more
specifically address the coverage provided alcoholics and drug addicts under sections 503 and 504:
For purposes of sections 503 and 504 as such sections relate to
employment, such term does not include any individual who is an
alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs
prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol
or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the
safety of others.2 0
By explicitly excluding certain kinds of alcoholics and drug addicts, Congress implicitly recognized others as qualified for coverage under the Act. Even after amendment, however, the Act is not
free of ambiguity in terms of the scope of coverage afforded alcoholic and drug addicted employees. 2 '
Assuming that the employee or job applicant qualifies under
the definitional prerequisites of a "handicapped individual," and
also assuming that the employer is the recipient of the requisite
federal assistance, then under regulations promulgated pursuant to
the Act a qualified duty of reasonable accommodation devolves
upon the employer.2 Such accommodation may range from modifimore major life activities ....

(b) As used in the proceeding [sic] paragraph of this section, the phrase:
(iii) The term "physical or mental impairment" includes but is not limited to
such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular distrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer,
heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and drug addiction
and alcoholism.
29 C.F.R. § 32.3(a), (b)(iii) (1984).
17. Opinion Letter from Attorney General Griffin Bell to Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano (April 12, 1977). See Comment, supra note 10, at 512-16
for further discussion of the Attorney General's Opinion.
18. See Comment, supra note 10, at 516 n.59.
19. Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2984 (amending sections of chapters 29, 38, and 42
U.S.C.).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
21. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), where, although
the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to interpret § 504, the Court noted that "the
language of the statute, even after its amendment, is not free of ambiguity." Id. at 581.
22. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1984): "A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to
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cation of the employer's facility, to the restructuring of the handicapped employee's job. 23 In determining whether a particular accommodation would impose an undue hardship on an employer,
thereby rendering it an unreasonable accommodation, the regulations set forth the following considerations: "(1) The overall size of
the recipient's program with respect to number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget; (2) The type of the
recipient's operation, including the composition and structure of
the recipient's workforce; and (3) The nature and cost of the ac'24
commodation needed.
While under these regulations the reasonableness of a particular accommodation is made dependent on the relative size of the
employer's operation, the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis2 5 made it clear that, under section 504 itself, no major accommodation can be implied.2 The Davis Court
did, however, recognize that reasonable accommodations are within
the contemplation of the Act.27 In light of Davis, the scope of the
employer's duty to accommodate a handicapped employee remains
unclear.28
B.

The Elements of a Section 504 Case

Before examining specific cases in which the federal courts
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of its program."
23. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1984): "Reasonable accommodation may include: (1) Making
facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, and
(2) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar actions."
24. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1984).
25. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Davis involved a section 504 claim by a hearing impaired
individual, who was denied admission to the defendant's program on the basis of her handicap. Id. at 400. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the Court held that since the plaintiff was
not able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite of her handicap she was not an
"otherwise qualified" handicapped individual. Id. at 406. Moreover, the Davis Court ruled
that under section 504 the defendant was under no obligation to make extensive modifications in its program in order to accommodate the plaintiff. Id. at 410.
26. Id. at 411.
27. While the Davis Court held that the defendant was under no obligation to make
major modifications in its program in order to accommodate the plaintiff, the court did not
rule out regulations which encompassed a reasonable duty to accommodate:
It is possible to envision situations where an insistence on continuing past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped
persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered program. . . . Thus, situations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory.
Id. at 412-13.
28. See Comment, supra note 1, at 743.
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have attempted to construe the effect of the Act on the employment rights of alcoholic and drug addicted individuals, this comment first briefly outlines the elements of a section 504 case.
Section 504 provides only conditional protection of handicapped individuals from employment discrimination.29 As such:
"The pivotal issue is not whether the handicap was considered but
whether under all of the circumstances it [the handicap] provides a
reasonable basis for finding the plaintiff not to be qualified or not
as well qualified as other applicants." 30 To decide this issue, the
courts have developed the following three-step process of analysis:
1) The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing
that he was an otherwise qualified handicapped person apart
from his handicap, and was rejected under circumstances which
gave rise to the inference that his rejection was based solely on
his handicap;
2) Once plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, defendants
have the burden of going forward and proving that plaintiff was
not an otherwise qualified handicapped person, that is one who is
able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite of his
handicap, or that his rejection from the program was for reasons
other than his handicap;
3) The plaintiff then has the burden of going forward with
rebuttal evidence showing that the defendants' reasons for rejecting the plaintiff are based on misconceptions or unfounded
factual conclusions, and that reasons articulated for the rejection
other than the handicap encompass unjustified consideration of
the handicap itself.31
Under section 504, employers can assert several affirmative defenses in support of their decision either not to hire or to fire an
unrehabilitated alcoholic or drug addict.32 First, the employer can
argue that the "individuals current use prevents such individual
from performing the duties of the job."'33 Second, the employer can
29. The employment discrimination protections of section 504 apply only to an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Excluded from that definition is "any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or
drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job or ... would constitute a direct threat to property or to the safety of others." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
30. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981).
31. Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
This method of analysis is similar to, but not as strict as, that used by the courts in analyzing claims brought under Title VII. Id. at 1385, 1386. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
32. Section 7(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982), provides these defenses by
excluding from the definition of "handicapped individual" persons whose current use of alcohol or drugs either interferes with or is likely to interfere with job performance.
33. Id.
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argue that the individual's current use "would constitute a direct
threat to property or the safety of others. ' 34 Finally, even if the
employer cannot successfully assert either of the above defenses,
the employer can avoid liability under the Act by demonstrating
that the employment of the individual would require an accommodation which "would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of its program."3 5
C.

Cases Construing the Application of Section 504 to
Alcoholics and Drug Addicts

Davis v. Bucher 6 was a significant early case construing the
application of section 504 to drug addicts and to alcoholics by implication.31 The plaintiffs in Davis were recovered drug addicts to
whom employment had been denied by the City of Philadelphia
solely on the basis of their prior drug use.3 8 Thus, the key issue
that emerged under the plaintiffs' section 504 claim was whether or
not the plaintiffs were qualified handicapped individuals under the
statute.
Although decided before the 1978 amendments to the Act, the
Davis court used a definition of "qualified handicapped individual"
that was consistent with the amended Act:
I emphasize . .. that the statute and regulation apply only to
discrimination against qualified handicapped persons solely by
reason of their handicap. If in any individual situation it can be
shown that a particular addiction or prior drug use prevents successful performance of a job, the applicant need not be provided
the employment opportunity in question. 9
After considering the Attorney General's Opinion and Department
of Health, Education and Welfare regulations promulgated under
34. Id.
35. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1984). Recall that in Davis the Supreme Court made it clear
that any major modification of a program would constitute undue hardship. 442 U.S. at 410.
36. 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Another early section 504 case of interest is
Whitaker v. Board of Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In Whitaker the plaintiff was
a college professor who was an admitted alcoholic, but who contended that his alcoholism
was under control and not interfering with his assigned teaching responsibilities. The Whitaker court found these allegations sufficient to state a claim under section 504, and denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 106-09.
37. The regulations at issue excluded both alcoholics and drug addicts from consideration for employment: "The name of an eligible shall be removed from an eligible list for any
of the following reasons: . . . addiction to the intemperate use of intoxicating liquors or to
the use of harmful drugs." City Civil Service Regulation 10.0910, quoted in Davis, 451 F.
Supp. at 795.
38. Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 794.
39. Id. at 797 n.4.
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section 504, the court concluded "that persons with histories of
drug use, including present participants in methadone maintenance programs, are 'handicapped individuals' within the meaning
of the statutory and regulatory language. ' 40 On this basis, as well
as on the basis of constitutional claims,"1 the court enjoined the
city from further use of the employment policy at issue and remanded the case to a neutral hearing examiner for the determination of damages. 2
In Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Company, Inc.," the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals used the Davis definitional analysis in
evaluating the section 504 claim of the alcoholic plaintiff: "Individuals with current problems or histories of alcoholism or drug abuse
qualify as 'handicapped individuals' under this definition unless
their addiction or prior use can be shown to prevent successful performance of their jobs. '44 Noting that the employer had made no
showing that the plaintiff's alcoholism prevented the successful
performance of his job, the court concluded that the plaintiff qualified as a "handicapped individual." Fatal to the plaintiff's section
504 claim, however, was the court's determination that he failed to
establish any nexus between his discharge and federal financial assistance received by the employer as required under the Act.4 5
Hence, a necessary jurisdictional element was missing from the
plaintiff's case, and on this basis the Simpson appellate court upheld the lower court's dismissal."
40.

Id. at 796.
41. For a discussion of the Davis court's treatment of the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims, see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
42. Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 803-04. The appointment of the hearings examiner was necessitated by the plaintiffs' successful motion for class certification. Id.
43. 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980). The plaintiff in Simpson had been employed by the
defendant for 29 years, during the entirety of which he suffered from alcoholism. Following
unsuccessful treatment, the plaintiff was discharged after several unexcused absences. Id. at
1228.
44. Id. at 1231 n.8 (citing Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 796-97 n.4; Whitaker, 461 F. Supp. at
106 n.7).
45. Simpson, 629 F.2d 1232. In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction over an
employer under section 504, the employment discrimination must occur under a "program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
46. 629 F.2d 1232. In addition to asserting a claim under section 504, the plaintiff
asserted a claim under section 503(a) of the Act, which requires that the contractor in any
federal contract in excess of $2,500 "take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals." 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982). Noting that section
503(b) provides for the administrative enforcement of section 503(a), the appellate court
ruled that no private cause of action exists under section 503(a). Simpson, 629 F.2d at 1243-
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Federal Constitutional Claims

An examination of several leading cases dealing with the due
process and equal protection claims of alcoholic or drug addicted
employees illustrates the problems and prospects of asserting such
claims. Beyond its ruling based on section 504, the Davis court
found that the city's policy of excluding alcoholics and drug addicts from consideration for employment violated the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. Applying
47
the rational basis test to the plaintiffs' equal protection claim,
the court found that the exclusion of the plaintiffs on the basis of
their classification as former drug addicts served no legitimate governmental purpose. Thus, the court had "no hesitancy in terming a
regulation which bars former users and addicts from city employment, without any consideration of the merits of each individual
4' 8
case, overbroad and irrational.
Likewise, the Davis court found the city's broad policy of exclusion violative of the plaintiff's due process rights since "the City
had an obligation to at least give plaintiffs an opportunity to show
that their former drug use would not have affected their ability to
work to the City's satisfaction. 4 9 However laudible the Davis
court's decision to extend the mantle of constitutional protections
to the plaintiffs, both the court's equal protection analysis and due
process analysis are questionable.
1. Due Process
By its very terms, in order to sustain a claim under the due
process clause there must be state action which deprives a "person
of life, liberty, or property." 50 The Davis court, however, did not
identify any protected interest that was being denied the plaintiffs
without due process. An examination of the Supreme Court decision relied on by the Davis court in making its due process deter47. As authority for the use of the rational relationship test the Davis court cited
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), where the Supreme Court explained that under
this test a classification must be reasonable and have a substantial relation to the object of
the legislative action. The Johnson Court also stated that where a constitutional right of a
suspect class is abridged by legislation, then the legislation would have to pass a strict scrutiny test, whereby the legislation must be justified by demonstrating that it serves a compelling state interest. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 374, 375 n.14.
48. Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 799.
49. Id. at 800.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "[Nior shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1985

9

410

Montana
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 46REVIEW
[1985], Iss. 2, Art. 11
MONTANA

[Vol. 46

mination, Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur,51 emphasizes
this deficiency in the Davis court's rationale. In La Fleur the Supreme Court ruled that the mandatory termination provisions contained in a school district's teacher maternity regulations violated
the due process clause "because of their use of unwarranted conclusive presumptions that seriously burden the exercise of protected constitutional liberty. 5 2 Unlike Davis, in La Fleur the Supreme Court clearly identified a protected liberty interest that was
at stake: "The Court has long recognized that freedom of personal
life is one of the liberties
choice in matters of marriage and family
'5 3
protected by the Due Process Clause.
An opinion which stands in contrast to the flawed due process
analysis used in Davis is Whitaker v. Board of Higher Education
of City of New York. 4 In Whitaker an alcoholic professor asserted
a due process claim after he was denied tenure and his employment contract was not renewed.5 5 In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the Whitaker court noted that the plaintiff alleged
facts which if proven could establish that he had been denied, in
an arbitrary or capricious manner, both protected property and
liberty interests. The property interest was premised on the plain5
tiff's allegation that he had a reasonable expectation of tenure,'
while the liberty interest was based on the allegation that the em51. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). By citing La Fleurthe implication would naturally seem to be
that a liberty interest was being denied. The Davis court, however, by making an oblique
reference to employment status, seems to have assumed that a property interest was at
stake. See Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 800.
52. 414 U.S. at 651.
53. La Fleur, 414 U.S. at 639-40 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
54. 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
55. Id. at 101.
56. In analyzing the plaintiff's claim of a protected property interest, the Whitaker
court began by quoting from Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), where the
Supreme Court, in rejecting the claim asserted by a nontenured professor that he had a
property interest in his job, noted: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 577.
The Whitaker court, however, went on to note that in a companion case to Roth, Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Supreme Court recognized that the
absence of. . .an explicit contractual provision may not always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a "property" interest in reemployment .... A teacher
. . .who has held his position for a number of years, might be able to show from
the circumstances of this service-and from other relevant facts-that he has a
legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure."
Id. at 601-02. On the basis of Perry,the Whitaker court recognized that the plaintiff alleged
that he had a property interest in his job. Whitaker, 461 F. Supp. at 105.
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ployer's action harmed his reputation and attached a stigma. 7 The
plaintiff contended that the defendant's employment decision was
arbitrary or capricious, because it was based on the mistaken belief
that since the plaintiff was an alcoholic, he was unfit to teach.5 8
Thus, the Whitaker court properly found that the plaintiff had set
forth a prima facie claim for the denial of due process.
2.

Equal Protection

While the Davis court's equal protection analysis is on firmer
ground than its due process analysis, in light of subsequent case
law developments it is not without problems. In support of its
equal protection determination, the Davis court cited the federal
district court opinion in Beazer v. New York Transit Authority. 9
The plaintiffs in Beazer were recovering drug addicts, maintained
on methadone, who were either discharged or not hired by the
Transit Authority. In upholding the plaintiffs' equal protection
claim, the Beazer court concluded that a public entity such as the
Transit Authority could not bar persons from employment on the
basis of criteria which had no rational relationship to the demands
of the jobs to be performed. 6 1
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court opinion, 2 the United States Supreme Court reversed., 3
In rejecting the lower court's equal protection analysis, the Su57. The Whitaker court cited Roth in support of the recognition of such a liberty
interest, noting that:
Roth made clear "that where [an individual's] 'good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake' or 'the State, in declining to re-employ [that individual], imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities,' . . . he may claim a deprivation of
'liberty' under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Lombard v.
Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631, 637 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976, 95 S.
Ct. 1400, 43 L.Ed.2d 656 (1975), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at
573."
Whitaker, 461 F. Supp. at 105.
58. Whitaker, 461 F. Supp. at 103.
59. 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S.
568 (1979).
60. Id. at 1033-35. In light of the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal, this stands as
an important factual distinction between Beazer and Davis. Compare New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 572 n.3 and Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 794.
61. 399 F. Supp. at 1057. On this same basis, the Beazer court found a violation of the
plaintiffs' due process rights. Apparently lacking confidence in this theory, the plaintiffs
later dropped this claim on appeal. See infra note 67. The acts complained of in Beazer
arose before the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, thus foreclosing an action under
section 504.
62. Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977).
63. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
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preme Court noted the fact that the plaintiffs were still under
treatment at the time that they were either discharged or denied
employment,"' as well as the fact that the Transit Authority had a
legitimate concern for safety.6 5 In light of these facts the Supreme
Court found a rational basis to the employment policy at issue:
[T]he "no drugs" policy now enforced . . . is supported by the

legitimate inference that as long as a treatment program (or other
drug use) continues, a degree of uncertainty persists. Accordingly,
an employment policy that postpones eligibility until the treatment program has been completed, rather than accepting an intermediate point on an uncertain line, is rational. It is neither
unprincipled nor invidious66 in the sense that it implies disrespect
for the excluded subclass.
The Supreme Court in Beazer limited its opinion to addicts
still undergoing drug treatment.6 7 Thus, recovered addicts such as
the plaintiffs in Davis, could still conceivably prevail on an equal
protection claim by arguing that the fact of their recovery would
remove the legitimate inference of a rational basis from the employer's policy.
III.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS By ALCOHOLIC
EMPLOYEES UNDER MONTANA LAW

Unlike the federal effort to combat employment discrimination, 8 the State of Montana has addressed this problem through a
unified scheme of antidiscrimination statutes contained in the
Montana Human Rights Act.6 9 The comprehensive nature of the
discrimination ban is reflected in the list of conditions which are
protected by the Act: "The right to be free from discrimination
because of race, creed, religion, color, sex, physical or mental
handicap, age, or national origin is recognized as and declared to
'7 0
be a civil right.
64. Id. at 572 n.3, 588 n.32.
65. Id. at 593 n.40.
66. Id. at 591-92. Noting that the plaintiffs below did not pursue their due process
argument before the Supreme Court, the Court rejected it as meritless. Id. at 592 n.38.
67. The Supreme Court explicitly limited its opinion to current users of drugs. Id. at
573 n.3. Although Beazer arose before the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Supreme Court in Beazer did not rule out the possibility of section 504 providing employment discrimination protection for such individuals in the future. 440 U.S. at 581 n.20.
68. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
69. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 49 (1983). Although not statutorily denominated as such, the
antidiscrimination statutes contained in Title 49 of the Montana Code Annotated are commonly referred to as the "Montana Human Rights Act." See, e.g., Martinez v. Yellowstone
County Welfare Dep't, 70. MONT.CODE ANN.

Mont.

-,

626 P.2d 242, 245 (1981).

§ 49-1-102 (1983) (emphasis added). See also MoNT.
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This section of the comment first examines the Montana statutory scheme as it relates to employment discrimination against
alcoholics. This is followed by an examination of actions that have
been brought by alcoholic employees under these statutes.' Finally, this comment explores the implications of these actions for
future claims brought by alcoholic employees under the emerging
tort of wrongful discharge.
A.

Montana's Statutory Framework

Montana's recognition as a civil right of freedom from discrimination based on physical or mental handicap 7 explicitly includes
"the right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination. '73 In support of this right, employment discrimination on the
basis of mental or physical handicap has been made unlawful, except when the reasonable demands of the position require that the
employer make a distinction on the basis of the handicap.7 4 When
such an exemption is claimed by an employer, however, it must be
based on bona fide occupational qualifications, which are strictly
construed.7 5 Further, under regulations promulgated pursuant to
these statutes, employers in this state are under an affirmative obligation to make reasonable accommodations in the job in order to
permit the hiring of otherwise qualified handicapped individuals. 6
§§

49-2-303, -308 (1983). While the Montana Constitution also protects individuals from
discrimination on the basis of most of the factors listed above, handicap discrimination is
not among those factors listed in the constitution. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4, which
provides in relevant part: "Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution
shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account
of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas."
71. None of these cases have been heard by the Montana Supreme Court. Nor are
there any reported cases in which the state supreme court has dealt with due process or
equal protection claims asserted by an alcoholic employee. In the employment context in
general, however, the Montana Supreme Court has analyzed the state and federal due process claims of discharged employees on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972). See Reiter v. Yellowstone County, - Mont. -, 627 P.2d 845, 848 (1981). Likewise, the Montana Supreme Court merges state and federal precedent in analyzing equal
protection claims. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sullivan, 174 Mont. 491, 498-99, 571 P.2d 798, 802
(1977). Hence, the Montana courts likely would be receptive to the federal court's analysis
of constitutional claims brought by alcoholic employees discussed earlier. See supra notes
47-67 and accompanying text.
72. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-1-102 (1983).
73. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-1-102(1) (1983).
74. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303(1) (1983).
75. MONT.CODE ANN. § 49-2-303(2) (1983). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-402
(1983).
76. MONT. ADMIN. R. §§ 24.9.1404, -1405 (1980). See also J. REYNOLDS & L. TAYLOR,
RIGHTS OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED MONTANANS FROM A TO Z (undated), distributed by
the Developmental Disabilities/Montana Advocacy Program, Inc.
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Similar to federal statutes and regulations,7 however, these state
regulations recognize financial hardship and job safety as legitimate employer considerations in hiring a handicapped individual.7
Although alcoholics are not explicitly included in the statutory
definitions of either mental handicap79 or physical handicap8 0 the
Montana Commission for Human Rights [Commission] has found
alcoholism to be included under both definitions. On this basis, the
Commission has accorded alcoholics protection from employment
discrimination.
B.

Montana Commission for Human Rights Cases

In In the Matter of the Application of American Indian Action Council,8 ' an Indian organization from Great Falls sought a
declaratory judgment from the Commission on the status of alcoholics under Montana discrimination statutes.8 2 In analyzing this
issue, the Commission first looked to the Alcoholism and Drug Dependence Act 83 to discern state policy regarding alcoholics:
77. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
78. MONT. ADMIN. R. §§ 24.9.1404, -1405 (1984) are similar in this regard. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 24.9.1404 (1984) provides as follows:
PHYSICAL HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION AS A REASONABLE DEMAND
OF EMPLOYMENT (1) (a) Bona fide occupational qualification exceptions
as to physical handicaps, allowed as a reasonable demand of employment, will be
interpreted narrowly.
The following situations do not warrant the application of a bona fide occupational qualification exception.
(i)
The refusal to hire an individual because his/her physical handicap
would require the employer to make some physical adjustments to accommodate
the handicap, e.g., install a ramp for a wheel chair.
(ii)
The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of co-workers, the employer, clients, or customers.
(b) Where the physical requirements of a physically handicapped person
would force an extraordinary financial hardship upon an employer, a bona fide
occupational qualification exception may exist.
(c) Where an individual's physical handicap would endanger the safety of
himself or fellow workers a bona fide occupational qualification exception may
exist.
79. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(13) (1983): "'Mental handicap' means any
mental disability resulting in subaverage intellectual functioning or impaired social
competence."
80. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(16) (1983), which provides in relevant part:
"'Physical handicap' means a physical disability, infirmity, malformation, or disfigurement
which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect, or illness, including epilepsy."
81. In re American Indian Action Council, Case No. 288, Findings and Conclusions,
and Order (Oct. 1, 1976).
82. A second issue, on which the Commission made no ruling, was whether under the
antidiscrimination statutes a hospital is required to render medical services to an alcoholic.
American Indian Action Council, Order at 2-3.
83. Now codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-24-101, -306 (1983).
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It is the policy of the State of Montana to recognize alcoholism as
an illness and that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be
subjected to criminal prosecution because of their consumption of
alcoholic beverages but rather should be afforded a continuum of
treatment in order that they may lead normal lives as productive
members of society."
Next, the Commission looked at the Act's definition of "alcoholic,"
which at that time was defined as "a person who habitually lacks
self-control as to the use of alcoholic beverages, or uses alcoholic
beverages to the extent that his health is substantially impaired or
endangered or his social or economic function is substantially disrupted." 5 On the basis of these statutory provisions, the Commission determined that alcoholism is an illness and that an alcoholic
suffers from both a mental and a physical handicap within the
meaning of the antidiscrimination statutes.8 6
In subsequent cases the Commission has relied on this determination in evaluating employment discrimination claims filed by
alcoholics. In Ferres v. Granite County Sheriff's Department,87 the
Commission found that an applicant for a deputy sheriff position
was denied employment on the basis of his alcoholism. Relying on
its earlier ruling in American Indian Action Council, the Commission found this act violative of section 49-2-303 of the Montana
Code Annotated.88
In Fullerton v. Flathead County Commissioners,9 the Com84. Formerly codified at MONT.REv. CODE § 80-2708 (1947). That statement of policy
remains the same, and is now codified at MONT.CODE ANN. § 53-24-102 (1983). See American Indian Action Council, Findings and Conclusions at 2.
85. Formerly codified at MONT.Rav. CODE § 80-2709 (1947). American Indian Action
Council, Findings and Conclusions at 2. The statutory definition has been modified, and
now provides: " 'Alcoholic' means a person who has a chronic illness or disorder of behavior
characterized by repeated drinking of alcoholic beverages to the extent that it endangers the
health, interpersonal relationships, or economic function of the individual or public health,
welfare, or safety." MONT.CODE ANN. § 53-24-103(1) (1983).
86. American Indian Action Council, Findings and Conclusions at 3-4, Order at 1-2.
87. Case No. HpE 80-1289 (Sept. 29, 1981) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order.
88. Id. at 3-4. Although not denominated as such, the Commission applied an analysis
similar to the three-step process used under federal law. See supra text accompanying note
31. The Commission first noted that the applicant established a prima facie case of employment discrimination; second, the Commission noted that the employer attempted to establish that the applicant was not hired for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason; and finally,
the Commission found that the employers' attempt to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason
failed to overcome the applicant's prima facie case of discrimination. On judicial review, the
District Court for the Third Judicial District affirmed the Commission's determination of
discrimination, but remanded the case for the redetermination of damages. See Ferres v.
Granite County Sheriff's Dep't, Case No. HpkE 80-1289, Order Respecting Damages (Sept.
24, 1982).
89. Case No. SMsHpE 82-1683 (1983). Rulings on Exceptions, Findings of Fact, Con-
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mission explicitly applied the three-step analysis used under federal discrimination law in evaluating an alcoholic employee's discrimination claim. 90 Again relying on American Indian Action
Council, the Commission first found that the discharged employee
established a prima facie case by alleging discharge on the basis of
her alcoholism."1 Next, the Commission noted that the burden
shifted to the employer who articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. 2 Finally, the Commission found that
the employee was able to prove that the reasons for discharge put
forth by the employer were pretextual1 3 On this basis, the Commission found that the employer engaged in unlawful employment
discrimination. 4
In the three cases discussed above, the Commission has developed a sound methodology for evaluating the discrimination claims
of alcoholic employees. Since Montana statutes clearly reflect the
public policy determination to classify alcoholism as an illness, the
Commission is on solid ground in treating alcoholism as a mental
and physical handicap. Likewise, the methodology used by the
Commission incorporates consideration of the employer's legitimate reasons for not hiring the handicapped individual. In the balance hangs the Commission's determination of whether the employer committed an act of unlawful discrimination. With the
recent emergence of the tort of wrongful discharge, however, such a
case is increasingly unlikely to end there.
clusions of Law and Final Order.
90. Id. at 7-9. The Commission relied on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1972) for this analysis. In McDonnell Douglas the Supreme Court used the three-step
analysis in upholding the claim of racial discrimination filed by a black employee under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982). Noting the similarity
between Title VII and the antidiscrimination statutes contained in Title 49 of MONT. CODE
ANN., the Montana Supreme Court has relied on federal employment discrimination case
law, and specifically McDonnell Douglas, in construing Title 49. See Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Dep't, - Mont. -, 626 P.2d 242, 245 (1981). Although Title VII
is limited to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, the physically and mentally handicapped are protected from discrimination under
Title 49. Thus, use of federal precedent is appropriate in the handicapped discrimination
context under Montana law.
91. Fullerton, Case No. SMsHpE 82-1683, at 7. The employer, a recovered alcoholic,
alleged that she was discharged from her job as a clerk because of the employer's presumption that her reassociation with her ex-husband, also an alcoholic, would inevitably lead to
renewed drinking problems.
92. Id. at 7-8. The employer alleged that the employee's discharge was due to her poor
work history.
93. Id. at 8. This determination was reached by weighing the competing evidence.
94. Id. at 9.
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C.

Wrongful Discharge and the Alcoholic Employee

The tort of wrongful discharge was first recognized by the
Montana Supreme Court in Keneally v. Orgain,95 where the court
explained that:
[A] discharge by an employer in a contract terminable at will
does not give rise to a claim for wrongful discharge in the ordinary sense, though the firing or the termination may have been
unjustified. It is only when a public policy has been violated in
connection with the wrongful discharge that the cause of action
arises."'
Although the Montana Supreme Court has subsequently indicated
that standards of public policy may be derived from an array of
sources, 97 the court has explicitly recognized administrative rules9 8
and statutes 9 as sources of public policy in wrongful discharge actions. Hence, both the Montana Human Rights Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it could be used by a discharged
employee in bringing an action against the employer for wrongful
discharge.
The leading case in this regard is Owens v. Parker Drilling
Co. 100 In Owens the supreme court not only found that the discrimination in employment statutes provided a solid basis for a
wrongful discharge action by a physically handicapped individual,
but the court also found that punitive damages could be recovered
from such an action:
These statutes were specifically designed to protect handicapped
persons from the denial of a substantial right to fair treatment in
the employment relationship; such denial would result in economic harm to such persons and their families, as well as damage
to their sense of self esteem. Violation of this statute warrants a
claim for punitive damages if such violation is shown to be inten10 1
tional or reckless. '
Assuming that the Montana Supreme Court sustains the Commission's treatment of alcoholics as handicapped individuals under
the Human Rights Act, alcoholics who are either discharged or not
hired for nonlegitimate discriminatory reasons now can bring
95.
96.
97.
(1984).
98.
99.
100.
101.

186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980).
186 Mont. at 6, 606 P.2d at 129.
See Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co.,

__

Mont.

., 687 P.2d 1015

See Nye, - Mont. at __,
639 P.2d at 502.
See Owens, - Mont. at -, 676 P.2d at 165.
__
Mont. -, 676 P.2d 162 (1984).
Id. at __, 676 P.2d at 165.
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wrongful discharge actions against such employers.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Under both federal and state law, alcoholism is now considered a handicap. Whether an alcoholic is thereby protected from
discrimination in hiring or discharge depends on the consideration
of competing legitimate employer concerns, including the capabilities of the individual to perform the job, safety, and undue hardship caused by accommodation. While in the first instance employers balance the competing considerations required under these
laws, an aggrieved alcoholic can seek both administrative and judicial review of adverse employer decisions. Moreover, in Montana
employers must now be wary of liability under the tort of wrongful
discharge.
On one level, these laws saddle employers with yet another legal responsibility that is extraneous to their primary economic
function. More fundamentally, however, these laws reflect a spirited attempt by our political system to resolve a significant human
problem in a manner that seeks to strike a viable balance between
the gainful employment of troubled individuals on the one hand,
and the legitimate business concerns of the employer on the other.
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